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Abstract: I argue that Hume’s philosophy of time is relationist in the following two
senses. 1) Standard definition of relationism. Time is a succession of indivisible
moments. Hence there is no time independent of change. Time is a relational, not
substantial feature of the world. 2) Rigid relationism. There is no evidence of uni-
form natural standard for synchronization of clocks. No absolute temporal metric
is available. There are countless times, and no time is privileged. Combining 1) and
2) shows that Hume’s ontology of time is thoroughly relationist.
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1 Introduction
In the process of composing his Treatise of Human Nature in La Flèche, Pierre
Bayle’s dictionary entries on Zeno’s paradoxes and lectures on physics provided
the background for DavidHume’s understanding of the composition of extension.1, 2
In Hume’s understanding, space is not constituted of infinitesimals. It is made of
unextended and indivisible mathematical points. They form real extension. Space
is like a pearl necklace, inwhich parts are arranged one next to the other. Likewise,
time is structured of indivisible, successive moments that come one after another
like chords in a song. Unlike space, time does not consist of co-existing parts.
Co-existence is not a temporal relation. There needs to be succession and
perceivable change for there to be time. The present moment is not infinitely
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divisible, as time’s parts would in that case exist simultaneously (Baxter 2016: 173;
Ryan 2019: 38–40).
Hume’s rejection of infinitesimals and its connection to his epistemology and
metaphysics of time is well-known (Wright’s 2016 monograph is an excellent
example). What has remained an understudied topic is Hume’s ontology of time in
relation to the doctrine of relationism. It is clear from the outset that his views are
closer to relational accounts than substantivalist ones. On defending the sub-
stantivalist thesis, Isaac Newton argued for an absolute and universal, imper-
ceptible and non-measurable time (Principia, First Book, Scholium to the
Definitions). In his view, time itself flows equally. It exists by itself, independently
of anything else. The standard relationist view comes from G. W. Leibniz. In his
correspondence with Samuel Clarke, he says that time, along with space, is
“something merely relative.” Leibniz (1989: 324) describes time as “an order of
successions.” Hume thinks in the same fashion: there is no duration over and
above the succession of simple moments. Time as we experience is an abstraction
of perceivable change. Althoughwemight hold on to a vulgar belief in an absolute
time thatflows equally across space, there is no sensory evidence andno adequate,
representing idea of such a putative flow.
Hume’s position is clearly not a substantivalist one, but it is unclear in what
specific sense it canbe called relationist. Theword ‘relationism’ is not anexact term.
Itwasnot used in the antiquity or the earlymodernperiod. Itwas created, to thebest
of my knowledge, in the 20th century to interpret 17th and 18th century debates on
the nature of space, time, andmotion, and to assess the ramifications of relativistic
physics.3 In broad strokes, a relationist on time defends the view that there is no
such thing as time itself. If one were to remove all physical objects and mental
beings of the universe—including the change which occurs in physical objects and
the train of thoughts in the minds of conscious creatures—there would be no time.
To provide a cursory definition, the relationist holds on to two theses: i) time is
essentially dependent on change, and ii) time is nothing over and above temporal
relations, like before and after. Relationists might disagree on how exactly time
dependsuponchange. Yet they agree thatwithout change there is no time.4Another
3 I amnot surewho is thefirst one to use the term ‘relationism.’ Leibniz does not use the term in his
correspondence with Clarke in the mid-1710s. Neither did Mach in his Science of Mechanics
(original German publication in 1893). Even early defenders of Einstein, like Schlick in his Space
and Time in Contemporary Physics (original German publication in 1917) and Reichenbach in his
The Philosophy of Space and Time (original German publication in 1928) did not lean on the explicit
doctrine of relationism. For an overview of relationism, see Gardner (1977), Mach (1919), Schlick
(1963), Reichenbach (1958).
4 Morganti (2017) is an exception.
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key feature of relationism is that time is a relation, not a substance, or any kind of
self-existing entity. As there is no such thing as time itself, there is no observer-
independent structure that provides objective metric for any durations. Temporal
intervals between events are not grounded in any ‘true’ time. They are relative.
Roughly and broadly, Aristotle argued for a relationist ontology in the sense that
time depends essentially on change,5 and 20th century relativistic physics implies
that there is neither absolute nor universal time. As this essay pursues an under-
standing of Hume’s relationism, I will limit my examination to his early modern
predecessors.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. The next section lays out the
relevant early modern theories that came before Hume. Although widely known
doctrines, they are an important background for understanding the main argu-
ment of this essay. I wish to show thatwhileHume andhis predecessors did not use
the term ‘relationism’, they did devise an ontology of time that is properly rela-
tionist. It will be argued that, on some general level, Leibniz and Hume share a
commonnon-absolutist ontology of time. Yet in articulating his relationist views in
his correspondence with Clarke, Leibniz leans on ultimate theological and meta-
physical principles, namely the principle of sufficient reason and the identity of
indiscernibles. Hume’s strictly empiricist philosophy of time does not rely on such
principles. I will therefore refer to George Berkeley’s take on time in hisPrinciples of
HumanKnowledge. His relationism is remarkably close toHume’s as it is based on a
corpuscular account of time. Both Berkeley and Hume see time as made of indi-
visible items succeeding each other. The difference between Berkeley and Hume is
that the former is not a conventionalist throughout: the standard of timekeeping is
eventually founded on God’s good will. For the latter, there is no rational justifi-
cation for the uniformity of nature, and hence no absolute foundation of temporal
intervals. Our belief in a universal true time is a fiction. The subsequent section
provides the main argument of this paper, that is, a clarification of what type of
relationism Hume maintains in his ontology of time. 1) There is no time without
change, that is, succession of indivisible moments. Hence time does not exist
substantially, by itself, but in relation to change of objects. 2) There is no evidence
for equal natural temporal intervals that would function as a standard for our
measures of time. As we do not possess an objective temporal metric, lengths of
durations are estimated by subjective sensory perception and with artefactual
measuring devices. Time is inherently subjective: there are as many times as there
5 This position is articulated by Bardon (2013). Coope (2005) thinks Aristotle’s philosophy of time
is drastically different from contemporary ontologies of time, and so it might not fit with 20th
century labels.
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areminds and timekeepers. The closing section concludes that Hume’s position on
time is thereby relationist throughout.
2 Early Modern Precursors
For Leibniz, unlike for Newton, bodies move due to their internal active forces, not
because of external impressed forces. Hence there is no need to refer to absolute
space and time to distinguish rest, inertial motion, and accelerative motion.
Leibniz accounts for motion in terms of modifications of living and dead forces
(Tho 2017: Section 4.4). He deliberately criticizes substantivalism on space and
time in his correspondence with Newton’s spokesperson Clarke. In the view of
Jeffrey K. McDonough (2019: Section 5.1), Clarke has four key points Leibniz dis-
agrees with:
– “First, space and time are logically and metaphysically prior to physical
bodies and events.”
– “Second, physical bodies and events exist within space and time.”
– “Third, although we may distinguish regions, or ‘parts,’ of space and time,
neither space nor time strictly speaking are divisible since no region of space
or time could be separated, or ‘pulled apart,’ from any other region.”
– “Fourth, ontologically speaking, space and time may be identified with at-
tributes of God: infinite space just is the attribute of God’s Immensity, while
infinite time just is the attribute of God’s Eternity.”
Leibniz declines Newton’s omnipresence theology and criticizes him for violating
the principles of sufficient reason and identity of indiscernibles. In his Opticks, at
the very end of Query 28, Newton refers to space as God’s sensorium. By this
Newton by and large means that the incorporeal God in infinite space perceives
things themselves.6 Leibniz finds this to be a deeply confused and impious notion.
Metaphysically, Newton’s absolute space as infinite and completely homogenous
violates the principle of sufficient reason. According toNewton, an impressed force
determines the direction of the body impressed. Yet infinite and homogenous
space does not imply the direction of such a motion. One could in principle rotate
the putative absolute space 180°, and this would not make any difference on the
direction of any motions. For Leibniz, there should be some reason why God
creates the space oriented in one way and not the other. Relatedly, such a space
would violate the principle of identity of indiscernibles: there would be two
distinct things that exactly resemble each other (Forrest 2010). Not even God could
6 For a thorough analysis of the concept of sensorium in Newton, see Kassler (2018).
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tell the difference between a space oriented in oneway and another space oriented
in the exact opposite way. Applying the principle of sufficient reason, Leibniz
(1989: 325) describes time:
… instants, considered without the things, are nothing at all and that they consist only in the
successive order of things; this order remaining the same, one of the two states, namely, that
of a supposed anticipation, would not at all differ, nor could be discerned from the other
which now is.
This characterization is based on the idea that if God had created the universe in an
infinite andperfectly homogenous time, there is no sufficient reasonwhyHewould
have created the world at one time rather than on some other time. If time is
infinite, there is nothing remarkable about the time the world was created. As
Newton’s philosophy of time does not satisfy Leibniz’s principle of sufficient
reason, it ought to be rejected.
Instead of a substantive treatment of space and time, Leibniz offers a relational
account. Space and time are not things which contain bodies, but relations among
things. Distances and durations are relative to bodies and events, not independent
of them. This alternative account of time does not base temporal relations in self-
existing time. Instead, temporal relations like before and after hold among events.
Likewise, parts of time, that is, instants, exist in a succession. An individual instant
has no substantial existence. There must be a sequence of instances in order there
to be a passage of time.
On some general level, it can be said that both Leibniz and Hume share a
common non-absolutist ontology of time. Leibniz’s criticism of omnipresence
theology7 and some of his verificationist trends8 are also hospitable to Hume. Yet
Leibniz’s criticism of Newton is based on ultimate metaphysical principles. Hume
starts at the empirical point and eschews speculation that goes beyond sensory
7 For Newton, absolute space is infinite in all three directions. Hume maintains we cannot
conceive infinities,whether an infinitely small or large object (T 1.2.1.2; SBN 26–7, T 1.2.1.5; SBN 28).
This already is inconsistentwithNewton’s dictum that God is everywhere. Russell (1997) details the
way Hume criticizes Clarke’s almighty space.
8 Many, for example Earman (1979: 263) and Jolley (2005: 85–6), have noted that Leibniz’s
principle of the identity of indiscernibles is remarkably like the positivist principle of verifiability.
If there is no observable difference in rotating the supposedly homogenous space 180°, then the
notion of absolute space becomes meaningless. Such a change would not have any observable
consequences; the two different spaces would be perfectly similar. Likewise, Hume does not
subscribe to absolute space in sense of pure extension, because our idea of space is derived from
tactile and visual impressions (1.2.3.15; SBN 38–9, T 1.2.4.2; SBN 39–40). The term ‘absolute space’
is meaningless as it cannot be annexed to any impression-based idea (Abstract 7 SBN 648–9, EHU
2.9; SBN 21–2).
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appearances (fn. 12 at T 1.2.5.26; SBN 638–9).9 He recommended Berkeley’s
Principles for the readers of his Treatise.10 In the interpretation of Darren Hynes
(2004: 339), Berkeley is a relationist as he treats time inseparable from the changes
that constitute time. We experience time as ideas undergo change in our minds.
There are as many series of times as there are minds. Like in his idealist theory of
matter, time is also made of corpuscles. Matter and time are not outside of mind.
They are collections of ideas (Garber 1982: Section 3). In the same way as indi-
visible ideas constitutematerial objects, they constitute time. An indivisible part of
time does not itself undergo change. There needs to be a plurality of ideas that
succeed each other.
Berkeley’s plausible source of influence is John Locke’s well-known explica-
tion of the origin of our idea of time, or duration bymeans of succession. According
to Locke, we get the idea of time from “the reflection of the train of ideas” (Essay
2.14.2). After explaining the origin of the idea of duration, he goes on to explain
howdurations aremeasured. He expounds onhowdifferent lengths of timemay be
compared. Locke suggests that planetary motions provide the best standards:
The diurnal, and annual revolutions of the sun, as having been from the beginning of nature,
constant, regular, and universally observable by all mankind, and supposed equal to one
another, have been with reason made use of for the measure of duration (Essay 2.14.19).
In the quote above, Locke’s rhetoric is cautious as he suggests that Earth’s rotation
and revolution around the Sun is supposed to take place at even intervals. This
approach may explain the psychological features of time-keeping synchronization.
Perhaps humans believe that there is a regular course of nature that is a proper
standard for our time-keeping devices, like clocks and calendars. This does not tell
us why natural processes are perfectly temporally equal. Berkeley agrees that what
Locke suggests is the common-sensical understanding of synchronization:
Bid your servantmeet you at such a time, in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate
on themeaning of those words: in conceiving that particular time and place, or themotion by
which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken, exclusive of all
those particular actions and ideas that diversifie the day, meerly for the continuation of
existence, or duration in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to
comprehend it (Principles, 97).
9 This does notmean that Hume’s philosophy of time is non-metaphysical. I wish to stress the fact
that, although Leibniz’s and Hume’s conclusions concerning time are interestingly analogical,
their starting points are very different.
10 Hume made this recommendation in a letter to Ramsay in 1737. The letter was made public by
Kozanecki in 1963. For Berkeley’s influence on Hume, see Popkin (1964). Note that here I am not
referring to the letter published by Morrisroe in early 1970’s, which is claimed to be fake (Wald-
mann 2020).
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Although thismight be an apt psychological account, it does not answerwhy some
clock is more accurate than another. A realist attitude on clock accuracy would
require that two equal temporal intervals be perfectly equal.11 The information
provided by our senses or measuring devices does not tell us whether the lapse
between event 1 and event 2 is equal to the lapse between events 2 and 3. Our senses
are imperfect, andmeasurements include error estimates. ThereforeNewton, in the
Scholium to the Definitions of his Principia, points out that notions like time, place
and motion “are popularly conceived solely with reference to the objects of sense
perception.” True and mathematical dimensions, for their part, are unobservable
and unmeasurable and can be conceived via the laws of motion.12 Berkeley trusted
that the temporal series in our minds reflect clockwork regularity because they are
ultimately based on the goodness of God (Hynes 2004: 339).
Next, I will focus on Hume on time. I shall first analyze the standard rela-
tionismwhich is apparent in his views on time. Then I shall interpret his skepticism
concerning absolute measure. This will corroborate the point that his ontology of
time instantiates relationism throughout.
3 Hume’s Relationism
3.1 Standard Relationism: Connecting Time to Change
In his science of human nature, Hume is interested in the capacity of the human
mind, and how we acquire ideas, like the idea of time. He rejects infinitesimals
based on his copy principle. A simple idea is caused by and resembles a simple
impression. We do not have an idea of infinity. We cannot think of an infinitely
small or an infinitely large object (T 1.2.1.2–5; SBN 26–8). In thinking anything, we
eventually reach a minimally sensible item. The minimally sensible item is the
threshold of our thinking. Going over this threshold destroys the idea in question.
In addition to delineating epistemic restrictions, commentators like Brown
(2012), Hakkarainen (2012) andWeintraub (2012) have noted that Hume supports a
nominalist metaphysics. In the course of denying abstract ideas, Hume is explicit
that “everything in nature is individual” (T 1.1.7.6; SBN 19–20). He thinks it is
11 For Locke’s temporal realism, see Bardon (2013: 29).
12 For example, by considering thedifferencebetweenanobjectmovingwith constant velocitywithin
absolute space, and anobjectmovingwith accelerativemotionwithin absolute space. In this scenario,
the two bodies both move equidistant spatial intervals. The inertially moving body does that in equal
times, whereas the accelerating body does that in different times. The concept of velocity in Newton’s
calculus is also relevant for his notion of absolute time (see Westfall 1993: 44).
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absurd that there could be, for example, a general indeterminate triangle “which
has no precise proportion of sides and angles” (Ibid.; see also T 1.3.1.7; SBN 72–3
and Cottrell 2020: Section 4.a) A ‘general triangle’ is not only an absurd term of
which we have no idea of, but it is also an absurdity “in fact and reality” (T 1.1.7.6;
SBN 19–20). Hence Hume’s copy principle relates to his ontology. The minimal
item is the ultimate part of any existent thing; everything that exists is a simple or
made of simples.13 The simple-complex distinction is ontological (Landy 2018: 30).
Simples are more fundamental than complexes and complexes less fundamental
than simples. Complexes are made of simples. Whenever we think of something
complex that is made of parts—like time—we may divide the complex to parts.
Jennifer Wright (2016: 61) sums up Hume’s nominalistically inclined starting
point nicely. “In the case of time,” she writes, ultimate parts
are moments. These moments are ontologically fundamental, playing this role in virtue of
being simple and indivisible. For Hume, their simplicity entails that, though they compose
durations, they themselves possess no duration.
The parts that constitute time are indivisible simples. An object that is a part of
succession is a part of time. Yet it is somewhat confusing to say that parts are
moments. This is what Hume himself says: “the indivisiblemoments of time must
be fill’d with some real object or existence, whose succession forms the duration,
and makes it be conceivable by the mind” (T 1.2.3.17; SBN 39, my emphasis).
Moment is a temporal notion.14 One unchanging, durationless object alone is not
temporal in any way. It constitutes time when it is a member of other indivisible
and distinct objects that come one after another. An unchangeable object does not
have any duration:
I know there are somewho pretend, that the idea of duration is applicable in a proper sense to
objects, which are perfectly unchangeable; and this I take to be the common opinion of
philosophers aswell as of the vulgar. But to be convinc’d of its falshoodweneed but reflect on
the foregoing conclusion, that the idea of duration is always deriv’d from a succession of
changeable objects, and can never be convey’d to the mind by any thing stedfast and un-
changeable. For it inevitably follows from thence, that since the idea of duration cannot be
deriv’d from such an object, it can never in any propriety or exactness be apply’d to it, nor can
any thing unchangeable be ever said to have duration (T 1.2.3.11; SBN 37).
13 For a detailed analysis of Hume’s argument for the ontological independence of simple
properties, see Hakkarainen (2011).
14 Chamber’s dictionary from 1728 (567) defines the term: “MOMENT, in Time, is themost minute,
and insensibleDivision of Time; or whatwe otherwise call an Instant.” In Humemoment is also the
most minute division of time, but it is not insensible and divisible to infinity.
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Hume allows, in 18th century parlance, that a philosopher and the vulgar
commonly believe that changeless objects endure by means of fiction.15 Un-
changing duration is to be treated as other fictions, like unity of aggregates and
continued existence of unperceived objects (Cottrell 2020: Section 5.b). We
have certain ways of talking in our every day lives. We might say, for example,
that a sports team is one. Hume thinks that a plurality of things is not one thing
but many things.16 Saying that a society formed by individuals is one thing is a
figure of speech. Simple things are more fundamental that complex things
because simples constitute complexes and the latter does not exist without the
former.
Time is made of many items that are in a succession. For there to be time, the
items need to be distinct, so that there is some way to separate the different items.
The often-repeated example concerns musical chords. An ongoing chord does not
cause the idea of time. It is not temporal in any way, because there is nothing
changing in such a sensible object. There should be a chord, another chord, pause,
another chord, and so on (Slavov 2019: 398). Only when there is more than one
object that is succeeded by another, we may conceive of time:
…we may conclude, that time cannot make its appearance to the mind, either alone, or
attended with a steady unchangeable object, but is always discover’d by some perceivable
succession of changeable objects (T 1.2.3.7; SBN 35).
As noted before, Hume’s science of human nature studies the way humans acquire
ideas (and reason with them). This could suggest that he is not interested in the
ontology of time at all. Science of human nature is a foundational, epistemic
endeavor.17 Perhaps Hume establishes a foundation and a corrective to all other
sciences, like parts of natural philosophy. Reasoning in physics, for example, is “in
some measure dependent on the science of Man” as it lies “under the cognizance of
men, and” is “judged of by their powers and faculties” (T 0.4; SBN xv). I agree that
whenHume assesses the notion of time, he isfirst and foremost concerned on howwe
conceive of time and experience temporality. To that end, it is enough for him to
explain“ the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our
ideas” (T 0.5; SBN xv–vi). This is the main objective of Hume’s principal work, “the
sole endofhis” logic.Hispositiveanswer is that time isanabstract idea that represents
“manner of appearance,” that is, moments succeeding each other (T 1.2.3.5; SBN 34).
15 For the status of fiction in Hume, see Butler (2010) and Cottrell (2020).
16 Baxter (2007) calls this ‘Hume’s plurality assumption.’ In the context of determinations of
extension, Hakkarainen (2019) disagrees. In his view, determinations of extension are unities. This
is however different from the composition of time.
17 This is Boehm’s (2016) position.
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The abstract idea of timepresents not a single distinct impression butmanners of their
disposition (Falkenstein 1997: 179–80).
Still, Hume’s epistemic argument has an ontological stretch. We cannot un-
derstand time without change. There is no notion of time without change. We can
conceive of an object that does not change. An object like this does not however
have a duration. Wright (2016: 54) hits the nail on the head:
His investigation into the concept of time resulted in his tightly binding the concept of time to
that of succession. So tightly that he concludes that the idea of time without change is
incoherent. This does not tell us that the world exhibits succession and so is temporal.
However, it does tell us that, if it does not exhibit succession, there is no sense in our calling it
temporal.
Hume is ambiguous onwhether there is succession in themind-independentworld
without succession of ideas. There could “be a real succession in the objects,” even
though we perceive no successions, and even if there is no one to perceive those
successions (T 1.2.3.7; SBN 35). Hume is however explicit that if there is no suc-
cession, there is no time. In more general terms, if there is no change, there is no
time.
Succession and change are related in the following way. The preceding
moment and the proceeding moment are distinguished bymeans of change. We
may differentiate earlier and later bits of time only on the condition that change
introduces a difference between them (Wright 2016: 86). There might be
perfectly stationary objects, but they do not instantiate temporality in any way.
“Time cannot make its appearance to the mind […] alone” (T 1.2.3.7; SBN 35),
because the term ‘time alone,’ or ‘time itself’ is incoherent. If there is time, there
is a succession of objects, that is, change. By connecting change with time,
Hume is committed to an ontological thesis.18 This is typical relationism. In his
own words: “Time is nothing but the manner, in which some real objects exist”
(T 1.2.5.28; SBN 64–5). This is relationism also in the sense that it stands in a
stark contrast to substantivalism. For Hume, time is not a thing. It is the way
things exist.
18 There is explicit textual evidence that shows Hume’s ontological commitment. In T 1.2.4 (SBN
39) Hume considers the finite nature of space and time and claims: “’Tis therefore possible for
space and time to exist conformable to this idea: And if it be possible, ‘tis certain they actually do
exist conformable to it.”
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3.2 Rigid relationism: Standards of Temporal Measurement
are Relative
Hume is a rigid relationist because he denies that there is an absolute standard for
clock synchronization. Consequently, there are as many times as there are minds
or timepieces. Beforemaking this argument, the problemof clock accuracymust be
made clear. An accurate clock is a device that ticks evenly. When a typical wrist-
watch ticks 60 times aminute, it is accurate if all the intervals between its units are
equal. The durations 1–2 s, 2–3 s… 58–59 s, 59–60 s should all be the same. Clocks
are subject to various disturbances. They drift.19 If accuracy is the objective in
constructing a clock, there must be some way to synchronize it. This requires a
standard of synchronization. There should be a common measure, an ideal clock
that ticks perfectly evenly. We could then compare local timekeepers to that ideal
standard of time. Different philosophies propose different answers as towhat is the
correct standard of accuracy. Newton thought it is the absolute, uniform flow of
time. Locke thought it is the uniformity of nature, more precisely the regularity of
astronomical motions. Berkeley thought it is the goodness of God. Hume thought
there is no such standard—or at least we do not have access to it.
Hume does not spill much ink onmeasurement. He addressesmeasurement in
concert with developing his views on the standards of equality and the status of
geometric ratios. In one paragraph, T 1.2.4.24 (SBN 47–9), he analyzes the stan-
dards of time-measurement. It is useful to break the paragraph into smaller parts.
Hume takes that
1) “A common measure, the notion of any correction beyond what we have
instruments and art tomake, is amere fiction of themind, and useless aswell as
incomprehensible.”
2) “The fiction however is very natural.”
3) “This appears very conspicuouslywith regard to time;where tho’ ‘tis evidentwe
have no exact method of determining the proportions of parts […] yet the
various corrections of our measures, and their different degrees of exactness,
have given us an obscure and implicit notion of a perfect and entire equality.”
According to the first point, a common measure beyond our technology is an
illusion. Perhaps the correct standard can be achieved by means of congruity? We
can estimate different proportions, greater, less, and equal, by comparing two
objects. Perhaps we could make comparisons, develop technology, and carry out
ever more precise measurements. However:
19 This is due to, for example, the materials that constitute the clocks, temperature, relative
motion, and gravitational potential.
Hume’s Thoroughly Relationist Ontology 11
We frequently correct our first opinion by a review and reflection; and pronounce those
objects to be equal, which at first we esteem’d unequal; and regard an object as less, tho’
before it appear’d greater than another. Nor is this the only correction, which these judgments
of our senses undergo; but we often discover our error by a juxta-position of the objects; or
where that is impracticable, by the use of some commonand invariablemeasure,which being
successively apply’d to each, informs us of their different proportions. And even this
correction is susceptible of a new correction, and of different degrees of exactness, according
to the nature of the instrument, by which we measure the bodies, and the care which we
employ in the comparison (T 1.2.4.23; SBN 47).
By using our senses and instruments to assess proportions, we may never be
perfectly certain that we have reached a correct judgment. To understand this
point, it is necessary to look at Hume’s classification of judgments on degrees of
quality in Treatise 1.3.1. Under closer inspection, he says that it is
impossible to judge exactly of the degrees of any quality, such as color, taste, heat, cold,when
the difference betwixt them is very small; yet ‘tis easy to decide, that any of them is superior or
inferior to another, when their difference is considerable (T 1.3.1.2; SBN 70).
The consideration above concerns qualitative differences. The basic point can be
applied in case of quantities, too. A considerable difference between two objects
may be intuited, and hence judged with a high degree of certainty. Small differ-
ences are subject to error estimates in measurement. They might be corrected
indefinitely by other measurements. Congruity does not provide us an impeccable
measure. Accordingly, we do not have access to perfect natural equality.20 As
Hume remarks concerning the second point, such standard is nevertheless very
natural to us. Instinctively we, as well as non-human animals, believe in the
uniformity of nature (as Hume details in EHU 5 and 9). Regarding the synchroni-
zation of clocks, as Locke pointed out, a supposedly natural uniformity is provided
by cyclical celestial motions. But even when we try to standardize our measure-
ments with “some common and invariable measure,” the corrections we make are
always “susceptible of a new correction” (T 1.2.4.23; SBN 47). Periodical processes
are not temporally equal like the two expressions in a simple algebraic equation.
Measures of rotations and revolutions are constantly corrected. Our calendars
need to be adjusted by arbitrary means to match celestial phenomena.
20 Proportions in quantity and number produce perfect equality. Both sides of the equation x = x
are the same, so the two ideas form a unity, x, which themind can clearly and distinctly conceive
(T 1.3.1.5; SBN 71). This standard of equality is confined within the relations of ideas. In the
Treatise, Hume seems to limit this standard to arithmetic and algebra specifically, whereas in the
first Enquiry 4.1 (SBN 25) geometry is also taken on board.
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Investigating natural regularities will never provide us with a perfect equality. The
quest for that standard would be a never-ending pursuit.
According to Hume’s third and most decisive point, we do not have an “exact
method of determining the proportions of parts” of time (T 1.2.4.24; SBN 47–9). If
there is no “perfect and entire equality” to compare ticks of a clock, then there are
no absolute criteria for judging which clock is the most accurate.21 This position
has intriguing consequences. There is in principle an indefinite number of clocks.
The readings of clocks might disagree on the intervals among certain events.
Compare clocks A and B.
Clock A. Extinction of the dinosaurs – one tick – turn of the third millennium
on Greenwich mean time.
ClockB. Turn of the thirdmillenniumonGreenwichmean time– billion ticks–
my submission of this essay.
This result is highly counterintuitive. If time is relative, then the temporal
interval from the extinction of the dinosaurs to year 2000 could be billion times
smaller than from the year 2000–2020. Without absolute and universal time, local
measures of time are all there is. There is no commonmeasure of time that dictates
which local measure is the ‘truest.’ There are as many times as there are minds or
devises that tick, or whatever we can use to track time. Hume’s relationism is rigid.
According to his ontology of time, temporal intervals—whether they are subjective
experiences of the passage of time ormeasures performed by artefactual machines
—are relative.
Although contrary to common-sense expectation, Hume’s relationism is both
philosophically and scientifically credible. Take the B-theory of time and the
ramifications of relativistic physics. The literature on these issues for the last
hundred years is voluminous and growing, so I must be highly selective and
concise. According to the B-theory, the earlier/later relation is invariant. Under no
circumstances is the second world war earlier than the first, or the first war later
than the second. The statements ‘WW1 precedes WW2’ and ‘WW2 succeeds WW1’
are true at all times. A notable fact about the two wars is that the first (at least
partly) caused the second. Hume happens to think that causation is temporally
asymmetrical. Cause is earlier, and effect is later.22 The order of causally related,
timelike separated events is not a relative matter (their time-interval is). This is
bolstered by the fact that, in a relativistic account of the world, an event is earlier
than a later event if an electromagnetic signal, or a signal slower than it, from an
21 There would still be relative criteria, like synchronization of clocks with a conventionally
chosen standard clock.
22 For scholarship on Hume on temporal priority of causes over their effects, see Hausmann
(1998), Ryan (2003) and Melamedoff (2019).
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earlier event reaches the later event. An observer has a definite past if an event is
located within their past light-cone, and a definite future if an event is located
within their future light-cone. Grouping together the fixed earlier/later relation of
the B-series and the light-cone limitations of the theory of relativity is consistent
with the view that a cause begins before its effect. This result holds even in the
absence of substantial time. Hume’s relational take on time is therefore not only
historically interesting, but credible considering the systematic theories in the
metaphysics of time.
4 In Conclusion
In this essay, I provided a historically sensitive and a philosophically feasible
rendition of Hume’s ontology of time. It is relationist in the standard sense: there is
no time itself as time is a manner of existence. The way time exists is dependent
upon change. It is also relationist in the narrower sense: there is no universal, one
and only true time thatwe all share. There are asmany times as there areminds and
timekeepers. My two-part argument contributes both to understanding Hume’s
own ontology of time as well as its place in the larger framework of the sub-
stantivalism/relationism debate.
Research Funding: Academy of Finland.
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